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siml1169/ShyPie

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ShyPie — privacy-first workflow for DeepSeek Harness + Magpie: documents are converted to text locally and PII is replaced with placeholders before anything can reach a model or the session log.

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ShyPie

ShyPie

Privacy-first workflow for DeepSeek Harness + Magpie

Keep PII on your machine: images and PDFs are converted to text locally, the local transcript stays readable by default, and Magpie masks the text before it leaves the machine. Anything that cannot be masked or filtered is blocked, not sent.

This repository is a reference implementation of a two-plugin combo for DeepSeek Harness (DSH) and Magpie:

Component npm package Role
plugins/dsh-privacy-gate @shypie_privacy/dsh-privacy-gate ShyPie Filter DSH host bundle: extracts attached images/PDFs locally, keeps tool/document text local by default, guards binary reads, and enforces a fail-closed llm/stream egress guard
Magpie middleware (merged in-tree) @magpie-community/middleware-privacy-gate Magpie gateway middleware: rejects or withholds content Magpie cannot mask (images, files, encoded blobs) for non-local models; binaryPolicy: guide withholds bytes and asks the model to choose a local extraction tool
packages/pii-core @shypie_privacy/pii-core Zero-dependency detector + keyed-placeholder library shared by both plugins
packages/local-extract @shypie_privacy/local-extract Local-only PDF / Office / scan → text CLI with fail-closed blocking

All four ShyPie packages are now published at 0.3.0: pii-core, local-extract, the DSH bundle, and the legacy Magpie package. The DSH bundle includes filter mode, image/PDF extraction and the composer switch. The Magpie middleware was merged into magpie-community/plugins at 28108dd (PR #685) as @magpie-community/middleware-privacy-gate; upstream is version 0.1.0, while a 0.3.0 release branch is prepared in the ShyPie fork but not merged, and the community npm package is not published. The DSH catalog entry PR #12308 is merged. Known open issue: guide-mode MIME metadata validation #795. docs/publish.md has the exact state.

It is a privacy-first workflow, not a guarantee: what it protects, and what it cannot, is documented precisely in docs/design.md and summarised below.

Why two plugins

  1. DSH's outbound request is immutable. It is a deep-frozen fold of the session log (dsh-agent-loop, markAgentLoopRequest), so a plugin cannot rewrite it on the way out. ShyPie Filter therefore does the local part it can do — extract attachments, block bytes it cannot mask, and enforce the provider allowlist — while Magpie masks text at the gateway.
  2. Magpie's masking is text-only. Its own documentation says "Images and file data are sent as they are. Text inside a screenshot is not masked." A gateway can never mask a PDF page or a screenshot, so the gateway must reject or withhold what it cannot mask. With binaryPolicy: guide, it replaces the bytes with metadata and a local-tool prompt; with the default fail, it returns 403.

ShyPie Filter covers what enters the DSH session log; Magpie covers text masking and every other agent behind the gateway (Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, scripts). The default textPolicy: filter keeps raw local text; textPolicy: mask restores local placeholder masking.

Architecture

flowchart TB
  subgraph DSH[DeepSeek Harness]
    direction TB
    U["user text / attachments"] --> G3["Gate 3<br/>user ingress filter"]
    T["tool call<br/>read / pwsh / MCP"] --> TOOL["tool execution"]
    TOOL --> G1["Gate 1<br/>tool-result filter"]
    PDF["PDF / image attachment"] --> EXT["local extraction / OCR<br/>pdftotext / Windows OCR"]
    EXT --> RED["local text (raw by default)"]
    RED --> PH["text"]
    EXT -.->|blocked| ERR["tool error<br/>no data"]
    G3 --> LOG["session log<br/>raw local text by default"]
    G1 --> LOG
    PH --> LOG
    LOG --> REQ["LLM request<br/>text to mask at gateway"]
    REQ --> EG{"DSH llm/stream<br/>egress guard"}
    EG -->|reject| BLOCK["turn fails<br/>PRIVACY_EGRESS_BLOCKED"]
  end
  subgraph MAGPIE[Magpie gateway controls]
    direction TB
    MW["privacy-gate middleware<br/>fail: reject image/file/audio;<br/>guide: withhold bytes + prompt"]
    MASK["built-in Privacy text masking<br/>raw PII is masked here"]
    MW --> MASK
  end
  EG -->|pass| GW["Magpie gateway"]
  GW --> MW
  MASK --> LLM["LLM provider"]
  OTHER["other agents<br/>Cursor / Copilot / Claude Code / scripts"] -.-> GW
  LLM --> OUT["model output"]
  OUT -.-> RH["privacy_rehydrate (optional)"]
  RH --> ART["local artifact"]
  classDef gate fill:#fff3cd,stroke:#b8860b,color:#000
  classDef reject fill:#f8d7da,stroke:#b02a37,color:#000
  class EG gate
  class BLOCK reject

What it protects

  • Tool and document ingress. Tool-result text and locally extracted attachment text are kept in the local transcript by default. PDFs, Office files, attached images and scans are converted with a local extractor/OCR first; unmaskable BLOB/media is blocked. Error-result meta is not rewritten and remains a documented local residual.
  • Local conversion only. Text layers use pdftotext; scans use pdftoppm plus a local OCR adapter (on Windows, the built-in Windows.Media.Ocr engine — no install, no network). If no local engine exists the call is blocked (NO_LOCAL_OCR), never sent to a cloud converter.
  • Attachments are converted, not forwarded. An attached image or PDF is read through the harness's attachment store, converted locally, and replaced by text before the message is logged — the step is rejected when the bytes cannot be read (no extractor, failed verification, empty result, imageParts: 'block' or fileParts: 'block').
  • Un-maskable payloads are rejected or withheld: base64/hex/data:-encoded documents (contiguous, line-wrapped or dump-formatted), image/file/audio parts to non-local providers, unknown binaries, encrypted PDFs. In textPolicy: filter the DSH egress guard allows plaintext PII only through the default magpie* provider; Magpie must have Privacy masking enabled. For other agents, binaryPolicy: guide replaces the binary part with type/size metadata and a prompt to use a local extraction tool, without forwarding the bytes.
  • Round-trip without exposing values. privacy_rehydrate resolves placeholders inside the tool and returns only {path, replaced, kinds}; the model can fill a form without seeing the value.

What it does not do

  • Free-text names are outside deterministic detection (use the word list or a local classifier).
  • Transformed values (reversed, re-encoded) are not detected; zero-width and soft-hyphen tricks are.
  • Detector false negatives are possible; the design is layered (rules → local gateway model → fail-closed blocks) but not complete. Read docs/design.md §12.
  • Local at-rest residues are named, not hidden: filter mode deliberately keeps raw tool/attachment text in the local DSH transcript; DSH also records the raw submitted prompt before any plugin seam, and Magpie's masking journal keeps values for 30 days.
  • History predating installation is replayed unchanged — start new sessions after installing.
  • The plugins are not installed by this repository; installation changes profile-wide state and is documented step by step.

Requirements

  • Windows 10/11 (the OCR and path policy are Windows-first; the core libraries are portable).
  • DeepSeek Harness with a configurable plugin profile, and Magpie running its local gateway.
  • pdftotext / pdftoppm / pdfinfo on PATH for PDF text and scan rendering (poppler).
  • Node.js 22+ for the test suite and CLI (the bundled DSH runtime works).
  • Optional: tesseract (an adapter exists but is untested here).

Quick start

The DSH bundle is on npm at 0.3.0 and contains the filter mode, image/PDF attachment extraction, and the composer switch. The Magpie middleware is merged in-tree at magpie-community/plugins but is not on npm yet; install it from a checkout until the community publishes it. The legacy @shypie_privacy/magpie-privacy-gate package is published at 0.3.0 and no longer referenced by the canonical docs.

  1. Install the Magpie middleware from the community checkout: git clone https://github.com/magpie-community/plugins, then magpie plugin add <clone>/packages/privacy-gate (replace <clone> with the clone path). After the community npm publish: magpie plugin add @magpie-community/middleware-privacy-gate.
  2. Install the DSH bundle — dsh plugin --profile <name> add @shypie_privacy/dsh-privacy-gate installs 0.3.0, including filter mode and PDF attachment extraction. Use the checkout (dsh plugin --profile <name> add "$repo/plugins/dsh-privacy-gate") for an unreleased local build.
  3. In Magpie, enable masking under Settings → Privacy (text half of the combo).
  4. Start a new DSH session and run the checks in docs/install.md.

Both plugins are reversible; no profile file is edited by hand. The install names are @magpie-community/middleware-privacy-gate and @shypie_privacy/dsh-privacy-gate; docs/publish.md covers the release state and the two marketplace listings.

Verify

node tests/run-all.mjs

Measured on the reference machine (Windows 11, Node 24, no network):

Suite Result
pii-core 61 tests, 60 pass (1 platform skip); 50,125-char doc with 2,133 hits redacts in 11.5 ms; 300k-digit run 40 ms
local-extract 49/49; text PDF, Office, local OCR, and all documented block reasons
dsh-privacy-gate 154/154; activation check registers 3 listeners, 1 guard, 5 tools; attached-image OCR and PDF/file extraction are covered; end-to-end image OCR against real winrt-ocr takes about 2.5 s
packages/privacy-gate (in-tree) 62/62 with bun test; bun scripts/check.mjs validates the registry merged at 28108dd
e2e 11/11 — synthetic invoice → local text → placeholders → gateway → mock vendor, with zero plaintext on the wire

The end-to-end suite uses only synthetic fixtures generated at test time. No real document, invoice, identity paper or personal record is present in this repository.

Repository layout

docs/
  design.md               design, threat model, gates, fail-closed matrix, limitations
  install.md              installation and verification guide
  interface-contract.md   frozen API / CLI / tool interfaces
  publish.md              npm publish order + Magpie and DSH marketplace listings
  research/               evidence: DSH seams (path:line), Magpie hook docs (URL + quote),
                          detector catalogue, measured engine matrix, background, security review
packages/
  pii-core/               detectors, keyed placeholders, encrypted vault
  local-extract/          local-only PDF / Office / OCR to text
plugins/
  dsh-privacy-gate/       DeepSeek Harness bundle
  magpie-privacy-gate/    legacy Magpie mirror (canonical: magpie-community/plugins/packages/privacy-gate)
marketplace/              submission files; Magpie PR #685 merged, DSH catalog PR #12308 merged
assets/brand/shypie/      selected icon package (SVG, PNG, favicon, platform exports)
config/                   example Magpie middleware options
tests/                    end-to-end tests and the one-command runner
LICENSE                   MIT

Documentation

  • Project status — the initial goal, goal → evidence alignment, and open items
  • Design — the full design and threat model
  • Install — installation, configuration, verification
  • Interface contract — the stable interfaces both plugins implement
  • Publish — npm release order and the Magpie / DSH marketplace listings
  • Research — evidence notes, measurements and the security review
  • Component READMEs: pii-core, local-extract, DSH gate, Magpie gate

Status

Reference implementation, tested on one Windows machine. Published: all four @shypie_privacy packages at 0.3.0 — pii-core, local-extract, dsh-privacy-gate, legacy magpie-privacy-gate. The merged Magpie middleware upstream is 0.1.0 at 28108dd; a 0.3.0 release branch is prepared in the ShyPie fork, not merged, and the community npm package is not published. The DSH catalog PR #12308 is merged, and the Magpie registry entry is merged. The legacy @shypie_privacy/magpie-privacy-gate npm package is retired. Known open issue: guide-mode MIME validation #795. Tag v0.3.0 is pushed; the GitHub release can be created from it. The live wiring was exercised manually on 2026-11-03: DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 headless with the bundle installed from npm, two-turn DeepSeek and Copilot gpt-6.1-sol sessions through a live Magpie gateway, and a temporary model-allowlist block that the gate rejected. The llm/stream guard and its stable PRIVACY_EGRESS_BLOCKED code were re-verified on 2026-11-05. On 2026-11-06 the merged guide mode was live-tested: an image was withheld, the model was asked to process it locally, and no image bytes reached the provider. OpenAI Responses encrypted_content and Anthropic thinking signature were replayed through Copilot-routed models and accepted (HTTP 200). It is not part of the automated suite; remaining verification limits are listed in docs/design.md §11.

Security issues: see SECURITY.md.

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